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Abstract 
This article offers a critical overview of expert identification evidence based on images. It 
reviews the Australian case law and then, in an interdisciplinary manner, endeavours to 
explain methodological, technical and theoretical problems with facial mapping evidence. 
It suggests that extant admissibility jurisprudence and traditional safeguards associated 
with expert opinion evidence and the adversarial trial might not adequately protect those 
accused of committing criminal acts when they are confronted with incriminating expert 
identification evidence. 
Introduction 
Photography was present at the birth of the forensic sciences. Nineteenth century police and 
pathologists used photographs to document crime scenes and preserve evidence (Beavan 
2002; Baden & Roach 2002). Its use by Alphonse Bertillon (1853-1914) as a system for 
recording anthropometric measurements, places it among the earliest of the modern 
identification technologies (see e.g. Cole 2001; Hutchings 2001). Photographic and video 
images continue to play important roles in criminal justice systems, particularly in the 
investigation and prosecution of crime. Indeed, in recent decades the forensic use of images 
has been proliferating. Yet, photographic and video evidence is fraught with dangers. 
Images do not speak for themselves: they require interpretation. Critical writings have 
cautioned us about using images to prove things (Sontag 1977; Barthes 1981; Sekula 1984; 
Solomon-Godeau 1991; Tagg 1988, 1992; Biber 2007; Mnookin 1998; Golan 2004a; 
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Valverde 2006; Young 1996, 2005; Loftus 1976; Porter 2007). This article considers the 
emergence of new forms of expert identification evidence and, via reference to a range of 
methodological, technical and theoretical criticisms, illustrates some of the limitations with 
the prevailing investigative and jurisprudential approaches to the use of images as evidence. 
In recent years, following a qualified prohibition on police identification evidence by the 
High Court in Smith v The Queen, Australian police, prosecutors and judges have 
increasingly looked to experts to interpret incriminating photographs and videos. Expert 
identification evidence based on such images is often described as facial mapping. Initially, 
the expert witnesses engaged in the aftermath of Smith sought to provide positive 
identification evidence. They opined that the accused and a person appearing in security (or 
surveillance) images were one and the same. Eventually, exhibiting some concern about this 
expert identification evidence, appellate courts restricted its scope to opinions about 
similarities between an unknown offender and the accused. 
This article is critical of recent trends in expert identification evidence based on images, 
some of the associated forensic practices and the evolving jurisprudence. For, as we intend 
to explain, much of the incriminating facial mapping evidence now routinely accepted in 
Australian courts is of unknown validity and reliability. It is, in consequence, our contention 
that empirical research is required to demonstrate the reliability of expert identification 
based on images and, in addition, that until such research is produced judges and others 
should be reconsidering the terms on which the criminal justice system engages with 
ostensibly incriminating images and related opinion evidence. 
Facial (and Body) Mapping: Definition of a Non ‘Field’ 
By way of background, it is necessary to say a few things about facial mapping. Though 
revealing, the lack of an accepted definition complicates this task. The phrase ‘facial 
mapping’ is used to cover a wide range of practices and techniques which are not 
standardised through teaching institutions, formal qualifications and regulatory bodies, and 
have not been evaluated through published experimental studies. Nevertheless, English 
courts have allowed facial mappers, and those using facial mapping techniques, to give 
opinion evidence about the identity of persons in images since the early 1990s.1 The 
emergence of expert identification evidence based on images in Australia is more recent and 
relatively independent of the developments in England. Much of what follows, however, 
applies to facial mapping evidence in Australia and England. 
Based on an international survey of those giving expert identification evidence derived 
from images, Kemp and Coulson (2008a) have proposed the following description of the 
comparisons associated with facial mapping: 
[The contents of] [t]wo or more photographic, video or other images are compared to determine 
whether they depict the same person, or a photographic, video or other image is compared to a 
‘live’ (i.e. corporeal) target … to determine whether the image is of the target individual. The 
process of comparison might involve taking measurements, noting characteristics, or other 
techniques, and might concentrate on the face alone or might include other parts of the body.2 
                                                                                                                             
1  The jurisprudence governing the admissibility of expert opinion in England is quite different. Key English 
‘facial mapping’ decisions include: R v Stockwell; R v Clarke; R v Hookway; Attorney General’s Reference (No 
2 of 2002); R v Gray. 
2  ‘Body mapping’ involves applying similar techniques to the body shape, body features, and movement. Those 
who use body shape and movement for purposes of identification may attempt to apply quantitative measures 
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Basically, there seem to be two ways to classify facial mapping evidence: one quantitative 
and the other qualitative. Generally, quantitative approaches rely on the measurement of key 
features of the face and body (often termed ‘landmarks’), as well as the distances and angles 
between these features. Such methods are often described as photo-anthropometry or 
photogrammetry (see Figure 1). The other, more qualitative, approach is concerned with the 
presence or absence of characteristic features, degrees of similarity and proportionality. 
These approaches are often referred to as morphological analyses or comparisons (see 
Figure 2). 
The following definitions were reproduced in R v Tang at [18]. 
Photo-anthropometry 
Photo-anthropometry is a technique that attempts to metrically compare the proportional 
relationships of one photo to another rather than determine absolute visual similarities, as is 
done in morphological comparisons. It involves the analysis of anthropometric landmarks, 
dimensions and angles [simply] to quantify facial characteristics and proportions from a 
photograph. 
Morphology analysis [facial and body mapping] 
The feature by feature approach to evaluating faces, heads and bodies. It involves the 
comparison of two images – one from the crime scene and one of the suspect. It involves 
subdividing the face, head and body into components to obtain a thorough qualitative analysis 
and to determine visual similarities or differences. 
In practice, it is not uncommon for witnesses giving expert identification evidence to 
incorporate elements of both approaches, though morphological analysis has come to 
dominate the Australian forensic experience. 
Overall, the facial mapping evidence received in Australian courts is produced using a 
variety of methods and tools. Australian courts have encountered photo-anthropometry, 
morphological analysis, the comparisons of faces and bodies (using video, photographs and 
enlarged photoboards), the overlaying of two similar size images (photographic 
superimposition), the rapid transition between two images (blink technique), the gradual 
transformation of one image into another (swipes), as well as photo and video enlargement, 
enhancement and manipulation (see Figure 3).3 
It is important to emphasise that the techniques and tools associated with facial mapping 
are not standardised and not always consistently applied by individual practitioners.4 One of 
the most conspicuous features of facial mapping and related forms of expert identification 
                                                                                                  
(e.g. anthropometric calculations around height or shoe size) and/or describe similarities and differences 
between body shapes (especially somatotype) and movement (e.g. right-handedness). Often the same expert 
will be engaged in, and allowed to testify about, face and body comparisons. With the necessary adaptations 
virtually all of the issues canvassed in this article are applicable to body mapping as well as face and body 
mapping. We tend to use the terms ‘facial mapping’ and ‘expert identification evidence based on images’ 
interchangeably even though the latter is more encompassing and not restricted to heads and faces. 
3  The photograph superimposition technique bears some resemblance to the ‘composite portraiture’ technique 
devised by Francis Galton (1822-1911), the British eugenicist, whose photographic superimpositions 
purportedly enabled him to identify the essential characteristics of criminal and racial ‘types’. See Galton 1883. 
4  Not all of the individuals involved in expert identification from images would describe themselves as ‘facial 
mappers’ or their work as ‘facial mapping’. Our primary concern, however, is with the validity and reliability 
of expert identification evidence rather than nomenclature, professional alignments, disciplinary hierarchies or 
the experience(s) of individual expert witnesses. 
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evidence is the absence of accepted procedures and protocols. At the heart of our critique 
lies a concern about the unknown validity and unknown reliability of facial mapping and 
related approaches to identification. We use the term to conveniently capture a diverse range 
of forensic practices. It is not our intention to reify ‘facial mapping’ or suggest that it is an 
established or credible ‘field of expertise’. 
Figure 1: Photogrammetric points and comparison. Once the images are scaled and 
oriented, the analyst compares sizes, distances and the angles between features 
and/or landmarks. (Figures 1 and 2 are from actual New Zealand case files. 
Courtesy of Rod McCourt, Global Intelligence Solutions.) 
Figure 2: Morphological comparison of ears (from Figure 1). Morphological 
comparisons tend to focus on overall similarities as well as the degree of 
similarity between particular features such as ears, noses and lips. 
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Figure 3: Photographic superimposition. Here, the face of Man B is superimposed onto 
the head of Man A (bottom left) and vice-versa (bottom right). (Once again 
these images are drawn from New Zealand case files. Courtesy of Rod 
McCourt, Global Intelligence Solutions.) 
 
The Emergence of Facial Mapping Evidence in Australia 
A Brief Introduction to the Australian Admissibility Framework 
How is it that incriminating facial mapping evidence has gained access to Australian courts? 
To understand these developments we need to review the rules of admissibility prescribed 
by the Uniform Evidence Law (UEL).5 
                                                                                                                             
5  Most of the reported cases were tried and appealed in NSW. The Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) forms part of the 
UEL and is very similar to the Evidence Acts used in the ACT, Tasmania, the Federal Courts and Victoria in 
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According to the UEL, to be admissible all evidence must be relevant: 
56 Relevant evidence to be admissible 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is 
admissible in the proceeding. 
(2) Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible. 
Evidence is relevant if it has probative value. According to the UEL Dictionary the 
‘probative value of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect 
the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’. Consequently, 
55 Relevant evidence 
(1) The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could 
rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence 
of a fact in issue in the proceeding. … 
Leaving aside the question of whether facial mapping evidence has probative value (more 
below), it has been admitted as a form of expert opinion evidence. Normally, even if 
relevant, opinions are presumptively inadmissible. The opinion rule (s76) states that 
‘evidence of an opinion’ is not admissible ‘to prove the existence of a fact about the 
existence of which the opinion was expressed’. There are, however, several exceptions to 
the exclusionary impact of the opinion rule. Although it does not attempt to codify the 
common law, s79 provides the major exception for expert opinion evidence. It reads: 
79 Exception: opinions based on specialised knowledge 
If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the 
opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or 
substantially based on the knowledge.  
Provided an ‘opinion’ is ‘wholly or substantially’ based on ‘specialised knowledge’ which 
is based on ‘training, study or experience’ it is not caught by the exclusionary opinion rule 
(see e.g. HG v The Queen at [39]). Where these conditions are satisfied, a witness can 
proffer relevant opinions about facts in issue, subject to the exclusionary discretions. In 
criminal proceedings, incriminating evidence is to be excluded if its probative value is 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused (s137).6 In all proceedings (i.e. 
civil and criminal), the probative value of the evidence may also be weighed against the 
danger that it is misleading, confusing, or an undue waste of time (ss 135 and 136). 
At common law a witness is usually allowed to give expert opinion evidence if the 
opinion is legally relevant and they are an ‘expert’ in a recognisable ‘field of knowledge’ 
(Clark v Ryan; Ramsay v Watson; R v Bonython at 46-47; for England, see R v Robb). In 
addition, judges often considered, particularly in civil cases, the basis of the expert’s opinion 
(Davie v Edinburgh Magistrates). Interest in the reasoning behind the opinion has been 
carried over into the interpretation of s79 of the UEL (Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v 
Sprowles; ASIC v Rich at [249]-[259]). 
                                                                                                  
the very near future. The following discussion, particularly the issues of validity, reliability and the exercise of 
judicial discretions, is also relevant to common law jurisdictions.  
6  The judicial discretions based around weighing ‘probative value’ against ‘unfair prejudice’ are sometimes 
referred to as the Christie discretions after R v Christie. 
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The High Court Creates a Need: Smith v The Queen (2001) 
The emergence in Australia of expert identification evidence based on images can be traced 
to the High Court’s decision in Smith v The Queen (2001).7 Mundarra Smith was convicted 
for his participation in a bank robbery. The prosecution case relied upon the evidence of two 
police officers who testified that they knew Smith and recognised him from Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) images taken during the robbery (see Figure 4).8 The police officers 
testified at trial despite objection from Smith’s counsel. In the NSW Court of Criminal 
Appeal (CCA) the admissibility of this evidence was challenged on the grounds that it was 
inadmissible opinion evidence (R v Smith 1999). The court considered the distinction 
between ‘fact’ and ‘opinion’ and concluded that the evidence of the police officers was 
evidence of fact – that is, recognition evidence – and not, therefore, caught by the 
exclusionary opinion rule.9 
Figure 4: Security photograph from Smith v The Queen. The person standing at the 
extreme right (with the dark hat) was identified by the police witnesses as 
Mundarra Smith. Reproduced with the permission of the District Court of 
NSW. 
                                                                                                                             
7  For further analysis of the Smith case, see Biber 2007 and 2006. 
8  Here, we might note, that the police officers who purported to identify the offender in the image (as Smith) had 
each had about half a dozen encounters, including several ‘brief (under five minute) conversations’, with Smith 
in the months preceding the robbery. One of the officers had arrested Smith twice and estimated spending two 
to three hours with him each time. 
9  Whether the evidence should be treated as ‘fact’, ‘opinion’ or ‘recognition’ evidence is, in actuality, quite a 
complex issue. Notably, this article does not concern itself with the opinions of witnesses who are very familiar 
with the person said to appear in images relevant to a crime. There are, however, good reasons to believe that 
lay people perform well when identifying individuals with whom they are very familiar even where the quality 
of the images is poor and the appearance brief. See, for example, R v Marsh. There are undoubtedly dangers 
with lay identifications from images, but few prima facie reasons to prevent lay individuals giving their 
opinions about the identity of those with whom they are very familiar, especially where the images are clearly 
resolved and afford good opportunities to observe the face and/or movement. See Edmond & San Roque 2009. 
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On appeal to the High Court most of the judges adopted a different approach. There, for 
the first time, the issue of relevance emerged. The majority concluded that the evidence of 
the police officers was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. The joint judgment explains 
the reasoning:  
The police witnesses were in no better position to make a comparison between the appellant and 
the person in the photographs than the jurors or, for that matter, some members of the public 
who had been sitting in court observing the proceedings. … Because the witness’s assertion of 
identity was founded on material no different from the material available to the jury from its 
own observation, the witness’s assertion that he recognised the appellant is not evidence that 
could rationally affect the assessment by the jury … The fact that someone else has reached a 
conclusion about the identity of the accused and the person in the picture does not provide any 
logical basis for affecting the jury’s assessment of the probability of the existence of that fact 
when the conclusion is based only on material that is not different in any substantial way from 
what is available to the jury (Smith v The Queen 2001 at [11]).10 
The majority, because they deemed the evidence of the police officers to have been 
irrelevant, did not broach the fact/opinion dichotomy. 
Although he agreed that the evidence of the police officers was inadmissible, Justice 
Kirby did not consider their opinions to be irrelevant. He accepted that their evidence might 
have low probative value, but the UEL only requires that the evidence has the ability to 
‘rationally affect … the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’. For 
Kirby J, the opinions of the police officers could have, if accepted, ‘rationally affected’ such 
an assessment. 
Having deemed the evidence relevant, Kirby J concluded there was no applicable 
exception to the opinion rule that would enable the police officers to testify about the 
identity of the offender. He explained: 
Two possible bases for exception from the opinion rule were explored in argument. The 
exception for admitting evidence based on specialised knowledge provided by s 79 of the Act 
[UEL] can be disregarded, as no suggestion of such expertise was made in relation to the police 
officers. Their prior contact with the appellant did not amount to ad hoc expertise based on 
familiarity, nor did they claim any expertise in, for example, anatomical or photographic 
comparisons. The exception for lay opinion evidence provided by s 78 of the Act states: 
The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if: 
(a) the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a 
matter or event, and 
(b) evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of 
the person’s perception of the matter or event. 
Neither police officer was present at the “matter or event” in question in the appellant’s trial, 
namely the robbery. Although the security photographs record the robbery taking place, the 
opinion of the police officers is “based on” the photographs and not, as such, “based on” the 
robbery itself which they did not see, hear or otherwise perceive (Smith at [59]-[60] emphasis 
added). 
                                                                                                                             
10  This interpretation is controvertible as the police officers’ exposure to Smith was purportedly independent and 
of a qualitatively different kind. They, for example, saw him moving, had interacted with him, and were often 
much closer than the jury. 
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These judgments did not mean that police officers (and others) would be permanently 
prevented from testifying about the identity of persons in images associated with criminal 
acts. The majority described a range of circumstances where the evidence of police officers 
– whether construed as evidence of ‘fact’ or ‘opinion’ – might yet prove relevant and 
admissible. 
In other cases, the evidence of identification will be relevant because it goes to an issue about 
the presence or absence of some identifying feature other than one apparent from observing the 
accused on trial and the photograph which is said to depict the accused. Thus, if it is suggested 
that the appearance of the accused, at trial, differs in some significant way from the accused’s 
appearance at the time of the offence, evidence from someone who knew how the accused 
looked at the time of the offence, that the picture depicted the accused as he or she appeared at 
that time, would not be irrelevant. Or if it is suggested that there is some distinctive feature 
revealed by the photographs (as, for example, a manner of walking) which would not be 
apparent to the jury in court, evidence both of that fact and the witness’s conclusion of identity 
would not be irrelevant (Smith at [15] emphasis added). 
And, Kirby J adverted to the possibility of engaging the services of those with ‘anatomical’ 
or ‘photographic’ expertise. 
Until Smith, police officers and other investigators routinely made positive identifications 
from images based on their prior interactions with the accused or the limited familiarity 
gained through the course of an investigation. After Smith, investigators and prosecutors 
effectively had two options. First, they could endeavour to utilise the exceptions to 
irrelevance identified by the majority in the extract above. These exceptions enabled 
investigators and police, in an ever-expanding range of circumstances, to proffer 
identification evidence linking a known individual to a suspect in a photograph or video 
associated with a criminal act.11 Second, police and prosecutors could seek the assistance of 
those with expertise – that is, pre-existing expertise – in disciplines such as anatomy, 
physical anthropology and photography. These experts, because of their ‘specialised 
knowledge’, would be able to give evidence about the identity of persons in images in a way 
that would provide an admissible exception to the rule against opinion evidence. It is this 
later form of opinion evidence that has given rise to facial mapping and its attendant 
dangers. 
Disciplining Professional Vision: From Positive Identifications to 
Similarities  
In the years immediately after Smith, expert identification evidence based on images seems 
to have received limited jurisprudential attention in Australian courts and tribunals. 
However, in the wake of the incident with the MV Tampa, tough scrutiny of asylum seekers 
spawned some of the earliest uses of facial mapping evidence in the context of immigration 
and border security (see also Marr 2003).12 In SHJB v Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, for example, the Minister relied upon the opinion 
evidence of a forensic anthropologist. There, Dr Watt testified that his morphological and 
                                                                                                                             
11  See, for example, R v Li and the treatment of voice recordings in Li and R v Leung and Wong. 
12  In 2001 a Norwegian registered ship, the MV Tampa, rescued 438 Afghans from a distressed fishing vessel in 
international waters off the Western Australian coast and sought passage to Christmas Island, an Australian 
territory. The conservative Australian Government refused the Tampa entry into Australian waters and 
deployed soldiers to assist that end. The action created a diplomatic incident between Australia, Norway, and 
Indonesia. 
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anthropometric comparisons of passport photographs enabled him to identify an asylum 
seeker, purporting to be from Afghanistan, as a known Pakistani national. Both the Refugee 
Review Tribunal and Justice Selway in the Federal Court of Australia accepted this 
evidence.13 Shortly thereafter, expert identification evidence based on images began to 
appear more frequently in criminal proceedings. 
Interestingly, facial mapping faltered at first in the criminal courts. The District Court of 
NSW became the first recorded Australian jurisdiction to take a critical stance against the 
admissibility of facial mapping evidence. In R v BLM, face and body mapping evidence was 
admitted in a trial at the Bidura Children’s Court and used to link M to an armed robbery.14 
Dr Meiya Sutisno, described as ‘a doctor of philosophy and medicine from the University of 
Sydney’, used photo-anthropometry, morphology and photo superimposition to make a 
positive identification – that the accused and the offender ‘were the same person’ – based 
upon her examination of images recorded by a CCTV system (BLM at 3).15 Dr Sutisno was, 
at that time, apparently unwilling to disclose her techniques, particularly the points she 
relied upon for facial comparisons and identification, because of concerns about her 
intellectual property rights. On appeal, Chief Judge Blanch expressed his unease at the 
reluctance of this witness to disclose or explain the techniques which supposedly enabled 
her to make a positive identification (BLM at 4, 10). Without an understanding of the basis 
for her opinion, the tribunal of fact was in no position to assess Dr Sutisno’s opinion 
evidence. Even though Blanch DCJ thought that some of the comparison evidence might be 
admissible, the magistrate’s decision to admit Dr Sutisno’s identification evidence was 
deemed to have been in error and the appeal was upheld. 
These ignominious beginnings were but a temporary setback for facial mapping in 
Australian criminal courts. 
Later in 2005, in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Bradley John Murdoch 
was convicted of the murder of Peter Falconio and the abduction of Joanne Lees. During the 
trial, prosecutors adduced and relied upon Dr Sutisno’s morphological assessment to 
implicate Murdoch (R v Murdoch at [82]).16 The circumstantial prosecution case included 
poorly resolved images of a person refuelling a vehicle, similar to one owned by Murdoch, 
in the relevant vicinity at a time proximate to the murder and abduction (see Figure 5). The 
images, described by the court as ‘enhanced’, were of such poor quality that the number 
plate, adjacent to where the person of interest was standing, could not be resolved (see 
Figure 5(b)) (R v Murdoch at [3]-[55], especially [10], [11], [12], [18], [20]; apparently the 
digital images were converted to analogue and then re-digitised and enhanced). 
Nevertheless, at trial Dr Sutisno was allowed to testify, based on comparisons of the 
video images taken at the truck stop and reference images of Murdoch, that in her opinion it 
was Murdoch at the truck stop. Chief Justice Martin made the following comments in his 
admissibility determination: 
                                                                                                                             
13  SHJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Kemp was called by lawyers for 
SHJB); NAFC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. See, more generally, 
Good 2006. 
14  In the matter of the appeal of BLM (unreported) District Court of NSW, 14 September 2005. 
15  Dr Sutisno holds a BSc (Hons) and a PhD in anatomy from the University of Sydney. Her PhD thesis is titled 
‘Human facial soft-tissue thickness and its value in forensic reconstruction’ (2003), and is concerned with the 
identification of human remains. While many of the leading cases seem to involve Dr Sutisno there are other 
expert witnesses providing similar types of identification evidence.  
16  Dr Sutisno was described by the court as a ‘forensic anatomist’ who had gained ‘anthropological experience’. 
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Dr Sutisno was an impressive witness. She is highly qualified and experienced in her field. … 
Applying both morphological analysis and photographic superimposition, Dr Sutisno concluded 
that the person depicted in the image taken from the security film was the accused. She was 
unable to identify any differences of significance (Murdoch at [95] emphasis added). 
The case of BLM was distinguished because Martin CJ was satisfied that ‘the principles 
underlying the work of Dr Sutisno can be readily understood’ (Murdoch at [112]).17 
Figure 5: (a) Individual identified as Murdoch entering truck stop; (b) Vehicle identified 
as Murdoch’s ‘truck’ at the truck stop (see number plate); (c) Individual 














                                                                                                                             
17  In Murdoch, Dr Sutisno did not rely upon anthropometrical techniques and evidence. 
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At about the same time the prosecution adduced and relied upon Dr Sutisno’s facial 
mapping evidence in the Supreme Court of NSW. In R v Tang positive identification 
evidence was admitted in a prosecution for armed robbery. Dr Sutisno testified that Hien 
Puoc Tang and a person in a series of incriminating images were ‘one and the same’ (R v 
Tang at [23]-[28]). This was based on morphological comparison and the presence of what 
were described as ‘unique identifiers’ (Tang at [27], [18], [26]).18 Dr Sutisno concluded: 
[I]t is my opinion that the multiplicity of common morphological features, unique identifiers and 
Asian characteristics to (sic) lend support that the offender and alleged suspect Hien TANG are 
one and the same (Tang at [28] italics added). 
During cross-examination Dr Sutisno rejected the suggestion ‘that there was a degree of 
subjectivity in her assessment’ (i.e., in her morphological comparisons; Tang at [78]-[81]).  
The appeal in Tang provided an Australian appellate court with the first opportunity to 
consider facial mapping evidence. Writing for the Court of Criminal Appeal, Chief Justice 
Spigelman expressed doubts about the facial and body mapping evidence presented by Dr 
Sutisno. In his judgment facial mapping – ‘let alone body mapping’ – evidence did not 
constitute ‘specialised knowledge’ (s79) and was incapable of supporting expert opinion as 
to identity.  
The evidence in this trial did not disclose, and did not permit a finding, that Dr Sutisno’s 
evidence was based on a study of anatomy. That evidence barely, if at all, rose above a 
subjective belief and it did not, in my opinion, manifest anything of a “specialised” character. It 
was not, in my opinion, shown to be “specialised knowledge” within the meaning of s79 (Tang 
at [140]; though compare [135]). 
And: 
Facial mapping, let alone body mapping, was not shown, on the evidence in the trial, to 
constitute “specialised knowledge” of a character which can support an opinion of identity 
(Tang at [146]). 
Curiously, rather than simply exclude the expert identification evidence, the Chief Justice 
accepted that Dr Sutisno’s anatomical qualifications and experience enabled her to observe 
and describe similarities and differences between the person in the security images and the 
reference photographs of the accused. Her opinion evidence could be admitted as ‘ad hoc 
expertise’. 
The identification of points of similarity by Dr Sutisno was based on her skill and training, 
particularly with respect to facial anatomy. It was also based on her experience with conducting 
such comparisons on a number of other occasions. Indeed, it could be supported by the 
experience gained with respect to the videotape itself through the course of multiple viewing, 
detailed selection, identification and magnification of images. By this process she had become 
what is sometimes referred to as an “ad hoc expert” (Tang at [120] emphasis added).19 
                                                                                                                             
18  Interestingly, in practice, ‘unique identifiers’ were not quite as unique as might have been imagined. Rather 
than scars, marks and tattoos, features such as ‘wide and thick upper and lower lips, wide square chin with 
dimple’ and ‘relatively upright posture’, have been used as ‘unique identifiers’ that enabled Dr Sutisno to 
testify in the oxymoronic terminology of ‘definitive resemblances’. 
19  For criticism of ad hoc expertise, see Edmond & San Roque 2009. 
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For the CCA, Dr Sutisno’s positive identification evidence was improperly admitted. Tang 
was entitled to a re-trial where Dr Sutisno, if called, would be restricted to describing 
similarities.20 
The evidence of Dr Sutisno of similarity, at least with respect to the facial features, is capable of 
adding strength to the Crown’s circumstantial case. Even if she is not able to express the 
conclusory opinions of the character she did express, she can give evidence which supports of 
(sic) the Crown case (Tang at [157]). 
Of significance, in its associated review of the admissibility of opinion evidence based on 
‘specialised knowledge’ under s79 of the UEL, the Tang Court dismissed the need for 
reliability: 
The focus of attention must be on the words “specialised knowledge”, not on the introduction of 
an extraneous idea such as “reliability” (Tang at [137]).21 
Here, in an appeal concerning the admissibility of incriminating opinion evidence, the 
validity and reliability of the evidence was regarded by the Chief Justice as ‘extraneous’. 
Incriminating facial mapping evidence remains admissible in the absence of: ‘specialised 
knowledge’; an accepted ‘field’ or discipline; validated techniques; peer review and 
publication; a known error rate; and information about the practitioner’s proficiency. The 
fact that the expert opinion evidence was not demonstrably reliable – and ‘did not permit a 
finding that ... [it] was based on a study of anatomy’, or ‘rose above a subjective belief’ – 
was not enough to warrant its exclusion under the opinion rule and its exceptions (ss 76 and 
79) or the exclusionary discretions (ss 135 and 137). 
Despite the critical remarks of the Chief Justice in Tang, Dr Sutisno and others continue 
to proffer expert identification evidence based on images in the NSW criminal courts. In a 
murder trial in the Supreme Court of NSW, just months after the appeal in Tang, Justice 
Hall admitted Dr Sutisno’s facial mapping evidence about the identity of a person in an 
ATM photograph. Responding to a challenge to the admissibility of this evidence Hall J 
explained: 
The evidence does establish that Dr. Sutisno does have specialised knowledge based on study 
and experience in relation to facial characteristics in the context of issues concerned with 
establishing identification both of deceased persons and otherwise. Such has become a 
recognised field for expert analysis, albeit of fairly recent origin. The opinion she has expressed 
as to similarities is an opinion within that field of specialised knowledge (R v Jung at [55] 
emphasis added).22 
In R v Jung Dr Sutisno was allowed to give facial mapping evidence but, following Tang, 
was prevented from making positive assertions about identity. Her written reports gave 
‘conclusory opinions’ but her testimony was restricted to the terms preferred by the CCA in 
Tang (Jung at [9]).23 Perhaps unremarkably, Justice Hislop adopted a similar approach in R 
v Kaliyanda.24 Here, again, most of the emphasis seems to have been placed on Dr Sutisno’s 
                                                                                                                             
20  At the re-trial facial mapping evidence was not relied upon and Tang was convicted. 
21  This approach resonates with the untenable High Court decision of Commissioner for Government Transport v 
Adamcik and the influential English appeal in Robb. 
22  The words ‘and otherwise’ make Dr Sutisno’s expertise expansive in ways that may not be clearly indexed to 
‘training, study or experience’, nor validity and reliability. 
23  During cross-examination on the voir dire, Dr Sutisno ‘was not prepared to admit that she could make a 
mistake’ using her techniques. 
24  R v Kaliyanda (unreported interlocutory judgment) Supreme Court of NSW, 17 October 2006. 
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qualifications, training and experience as an anatomist specialising in facial reconstruction, 
rather than the more fundamental question of the existence of ‘specialised knowledge’ and 
whether her techniques and opinions – or facial mapping more generally – were valid and 
reliable. None of the judges involved in Tang, Jung and Kaliyanda inquired whether Dr 
Sutisno could actually do what she claimed. 
In the course of just a few months, and notwithstanding Spigelman CJ’s muted 
incredulity in Tang, facial mapping became a legally recognised form of ‘specialised 
knowledge’. 
This trend was confirmed at the end of 2006 when Murdoch appealed his conviction to 
the Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal. Among the grounds of appeal was the 
admissibility of Dr Sutisno’s facial mapping evidence. Employing common law criteria, that 
court basically embraced the approach to facial mapping evidence proposed by the 
NSWCCA in Tang. 
This Court has found that the technique employed by Dr Sutisno did not have a sufficient basis 
to render the results arrived at by that means part of a field of knowledge which is a proper 
subject of expert evidence. However the evidence given by Dr Sutisno was capable of assisting 
the jury in terms of similarities between the person depicted in the truck stop footage and the 
appellant. It was evidence that related to, and was admissible as, demonstrating similarities but 
was not admissible as to positive identity. Dr Sutisno was not qualified to give evidence, as she 
did, based on “face and body mapping” as to whether the two men were, indeed, the same man. 
Her evidence in this regard should not have been received (Murdoch v The Queen at [300] 
emphasis added).25 
The Northern Territory CCA concluded that while Dr Sutisno should not have been allowed 
to make positive identifications, the admission of her testimony did not warrant a re-trial.26 
Smith effectively created a need for experts to assist the prosecution with incriminating 
interpretations of images. Since Tang (and Murdoch) experts have been prevented from 
making positive identifications. Now, as Jung, Kaliyanda, and a number of subsequent cases 
– such as R v Alrekabi and R v Pera in the District Court of NSW – attest, facial mapping 
testimony has become a legally recognised form of ‘specialised knowledge’ admissible in 
criminal proceedings.27 Police and prosecutors in NSW now routinely retain the services of 
experts, such as anatomists and physical anthropologists, to examine images and to testify 
about apparent similarities between suspects and images of persons of interest. 
Methodological and Technical Problems  
Having reviewed the ways in which facial mapping evidence is used, in this section we 
endeavour to explain why much of the expert identification evidence based on images may 
be unreliable and unfairly prejudicial. 
 
                                                                                                                             
25  The Northern Territory uses the common law rather than the UEL. 
26  The prosecution also relied upon low copy number (LCN) DNA evidence in Murdoch. This, as appeals in the 
UK suggest, seems to have its own reliability problems. See R v Hoey at [64]-[65]. For some discussion of the 
case and the use of CCTV images in the investigation see Gans 2007a and 2007b. 
27  See, for example, R v Alrekabi. Kemp testified in Alrekabi and Pera. 
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The discussion is divided into three main strands: 
(A) The lack of validation studies and the unknown reliability of facial mapping 
techniques; 
(B) Reasons why facial mapping techniques may be unreliable or lead to erroneous 
conclusions (whether positive identifications or apparent similarities); and 
(C) The impact of facial mapping evidence on fact finders (and courts of appeal). 
This discussion does not, it should be stressed, exclude the possibility of future 
developments through improved technology and research into the validity and reliability of 
identification techniques. 
Evaluating the Reliability and Validity of Facial Mapping 
Notwithstanding its routine use in the criminal courts of Australia, New Zealand and 
England, there is, curiously enough, no empirical evidence supporting the validity or 
reliability of facial mapping techniques.28  
The validity of a technique is the extent to which it does what it is claimed to do, while 
reliability is a measure of consistency or the extent to which the technique will produce the 
same results when repeatedly applied under varying conditions or by different operators. 
Reliability and validity are features of most scientific measurement systems. Because the 
validity and reliability of facial mapping have never been assessed we do not know whether 
the technique can be used to undertake accurate identifications, or the extent to which the 
conclusions reached using this technique will be consistent regardless of the operator, the 
methodology, the equipment, or the kinds of images.  
The reliability of a measurement technique is one of the factors which determines its 
accuracy and the probability that its application will result in an error (‘the error rate’). All 
measurement systems have some level of error associated with their use. This is acceptable 
provided the error rate and accuracy of the system are known and taken into account. The 
required level of accuracy of measurement, along with the tolerance for error, will depend 
upon the use to which the technique is being put.  
Where, as in the case of facial mapping, we attempt to use a measurement technique to 
make a binary (yes/no) decision (e.g. positive identification), the situation becomes more 
complicated. There are in fact two measures of accuracy and two measures of error rate to 
consider. If the objective of facial mapping is to decide whether or not two images are of the 
same person, then there are four possible outcomes. If the images are of the same person, we 
can either:  
(i)  correctly decide that they are of the same person (a hit), or  
(ii)  incorrectly decide that they are of different people (a miss or false negative error).  
If the images are of different people we can either:  
                                                                                                                             
28  Some expert witnesses suggest that convictions provide an empirical confirmation for their incriminating 
opinions. This is highly misleading. In most cases the facial mapping evidence is merely part, even if 
sometimes an important part, of the prosecution case. We, however, do not know what led the fact finder to 
decide. Most of the time we have no way of knowing whether they reached the correct decision or not. 
Conviction is not, in any simple sense, indicative of the validity or reliability of a technique, especially when 
evidence derived from that technique – even if unreliable – played a part in securing the conviction. 
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(iii)  wrongly conclude that they are of the same person (a false alarm or false positive 
error), or  
(iv)  correctly decide they are of different people (a correct rejection).29 
These outcomes are not independent of one another. If, for example, an operator always 
concludes that two images are of the same person, regardless of the evidence, the operator 
will have a perfect hit rate (i.e. 100 per cent), but will make a false positive error whenever 
presented with images of different people. In order to measure the ability of the operator to 
actually determine whether or not the two images are of the same person we need to 
measure both the hit rate and the false positive rate and combine these using a statistical 
technique known as signal detection theory (Stanislaw & Todorov 1999). 
Generally, the reliability, hit rate, false alarm rate and hence the validity of a system can 
be determined through a validation study. In the case of facial mapping, a standard 
validation study would ask subjects to evaluate pairs of images which the person 
administering the test knew to be of either the same or different people. In this way we 
could compare conclusions against the right answer. No formal evaluation of facial mapping 
has ever been attempted and as such we have no way of knowing how well the operators 
perform or even whether the same operator would reach the same conclusion when 
evaluating the same pair of images on separate occasions or against different background 
information.30 
Reasons to Doubt the Validity and Reliability of Facial Mapping Evidence 
In this sub-section we consider several factors that cast doubt on the value of facial mapping 
evidence. This discussion places the failure to undertake validation studies in a more critical 
light. 
Photographic Considerations and Technical Problems 
Practically, expert identification based on images involves comparing a questioned image 
(or images) with reference images of the suspect. In other areas of forensic identification, 
where photographs are the principal source for comparisons – such as footwear impressions, 
fingerprints, tyre impressions and toolmarks – strict controls are placed on the photographic 
capture of the questioned evidence and the recording of the exemplar (or reference) images 
and samples. Controls include: (a) making sure the image has sufficient resolution to resolve 
individual characteristics; (b) making sure the image integrity does not present problems 
with image distortion; and (c) using quality lighting (and sometimes chemicals) to enhance 
                                                                                                                             
29  Images or evidence may also be inconclusive. There may be questions about whether such evidence has 
probative value. See, for example, R v Dann. 
30  It might be argued that requiring a validation study is setting the bar too high. For, other widely accepted 
forensic techniques, such as fingerprinting, have never been formally evaluated in this way. Fingerprinting, 
however, is subject to proficiency testing designed to establish the analyst’s knowledge of the techniques and 
procedures that should apply, along with their ability to apply those techniques. Although proficiency testing 
does not tell us whether the technique is valid (and this includes identification based on latent fingerprints), it 
does indicate whether the individuals involved understand what they are required to do. (What they actually do 
is a separate question.) In the case of facial mapping, we do not know if the various procedures are valid or if 
the operators are doing similar things. (We will return to this point later.) It is also important to recognise that 
identification from latent fingerprints is currently confronting a raft of criticisms caused by the rise of DNA 
typing and the failure to credibly validate the various techniques and assumptions. See, for example, Cole 
2001, 2004, 2006; Lynch 2004. 
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the visualisation of marks. Such controls and standards are designed to ensure that 
questioned and exemplar images are suitable for forensic examination and comparison (see 
Horswell 2004; Bodziak 2000). They are standard for most forensic photography 
applications. 
Quality assurance also requires images to be taken with lenses free from rectilinear 
distortion (i.e. macro lenses) and the positioning of the camera in a way that effectively 
eliminates perspective distortion (caused by the camera angle). Camera exposure, lens 
focus, lighting and contrast should all be considered when comparing images of sufficient 
resolution and quality. Images sourced from CCTV cameras, mobile phones, ATMs and so 
on, generally do not meet the standards required in other forms of forensic identification and 
comparison. This tends to make the comparative analysis of images taken by CCTV (and 
other) cameras highly problematic. 
The compatibility of the questioned and exemplar images is of critical importance and 
should promote a ‘like-for-like’ type of comparison.31 This means that the exemplar (or 
reference) materials should replicate the image conditions used to capture the 
‘incriminating’ images. Two primary parameters are fundamental to the comparison of 
images (especially where the resolution is poor, more below). First, camera angles should 
match. This parameter might be considered obvious, yet courts and expert witnesses have 
routinely trivialised it. In other forms of comparative analysis photographs – e.g. footwear 
impressions and fingerprints – the camera is positioned perpendicular to the object (at 90°) 
to reduce distortion caused by variation in angles. Ideally, facial identification images 
should be taken from directly in front of the subject (e.g. passport photographs). Other 
angles will produce (perspective) distortion which significantly affects the representation of 
shape and size.32 Images sourced from most CCTV cameras are not taken perpendicular to 
the subject. Matching camera angle from sourced CCTV images is important to provide the 
same level of distortion encountered in the questioned and exemplar photographs (consider 
Figures 1 and 3).33 Second, image perspectives must be the same (or very similar).34 
Remarkably, this issue has been largely ignored in forensic contexts. Though, as we shall 
see, image perspective raises serious questions about the abilities of some witnesses, 
particularly anatomists and physical anthropologists (and police officers), to make accurate 
comparisons (whether anthropometric or morphological) by simply comparing images. 
Image perspective is a phenomenon resulting from the transformation of three-
dimensional objects into two-dimensional images. Image perspective can compress or 
expand visual space and can also change the size relationship between objects represented 
within an image. The three experimental images in Figure 6 were taken at different ‘u’ or 
                                                                                                                             
31  Porter & Doran (2000) proposed a conservative – indeed exclusionary oriented proposal –for high quality 
frontal photographs like those on identification documents (e.g. passports). It does not, however, address 
problems with the distribution of body features, poorly resolved images or the influence of experts. 
32  Perspective distortion can be observed in photographs of tall buildings taken from the ground with the camera 
pointing vertically. The resulting photograph represents the shape of the building as a curved trapezoid. In the 
resulting photograph, the size of the top of the tall building is smaller than the base which produces a distortion 
of relative size and shape. The same condition can be observed with facial morphology when non-
perpendicular angles are used. 
33  Comparative analysis of images displaying perspective distortion is undesirable for forensic examinations. 
Differences of shape and size will occur across the photographic frame and the representation of facial 
morphology is significantly affected. 
34  Image perspective is different to the perspective distortion caused by camera angle. It is an inherent condition 
regardless of camera angle. 
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camera distances. That is, the same subject was photographed at different distances from the 
theoretical centre of the lens.35 
Figure 6: Experimental images showing apparent changes in facial morphology using 
different image perspectives ((a), (b), (c), from left to right). Each image is 
subjected to roughly the same magnification. All components in the image 
(foam head, ear, nose and linear scales) are the same. Pins, which appear as 
black points, identify anatomical ‘landmarks’. (Images by G Porter.) 
 
An examination of these three photographs reveals considerable differences in the 
representation of the facial morphology caused by image perspective. In particular: 
• The nose appears to be shrinking in each photograph (from left to right), while 
the ear appears to be growing. 
• There are significant differences in the relative sizes of ear and nose 
(morphological indices) in each of the photographs. The nose appears larger 
than the ear in the first photograph. They appear to be approximately the same 
size in the second photograph. The nose appears to be significantly smaller 
than the ear in the third photograph.  
• The shape of the face, head and neck appear to be different in each of the 
images. 
• The vertical height of the nose relative to the height of the ear appears to vary. 
Similarly, any attempt to make an identification using anthropometry would have to 
overcome the effects of image perspective (and camera angles). The angles and distances 
between the landmark pins vary. Without more, re-orienting and re-scaling heads (and other 
                                                                                                                             
35  The ‘u’ distance is the physical distance between the theoretical centre of the lens (rear nodal point) and the 
subject.  
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body parts) on computer screens and then measuring distances and angles between 
‘landmarks’ is unlikely to produce useful, let alone reliable, information.36 
The significant differences in facial morphology in Figure 6 illustrate the need to 
consider the consequences of image perspective when comparing images, particularly a 
small selection of still images taken from a longer CCTV recording. It suggests that the 
application of vague taxonomic descriptors, such as ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’, may be 
highly misleading in the context of expert identification evidence. Here, we might also note 
that the use of technical anatomical terminology to describe facial features and shapes does 
not overcome the more fundamental question of what the head, nose and ear actually look 
like in reality. Using taxonomic descriptions indicated by Allison (1973), the face 
represented in Figure 6 might be characterised as ‘long’ (a), ‘oval’ (b) and ‘round’ (c). 
Describing the shape of the face or using the relative size of facial features (e.g. ears and 
noses) or distance and angles between pins (i.e. landmarks) substitutes the appearance of an 
image for an undistorted reality. What, after all, is the actual shape of the head? In reflecting 
on such issues it is useful to remember that these are high-quality full-frontal parodies. 
Different camera angles and lower resolution would accentuate the difficulty and variability 
of any analysis. 
Another common, and related, problem with images from CCTV cameras is the inability 
to record fine detail. This is commonly described as resolving power. Image resolution is 
often compromised in digital camera systems because of inexpensive optics and exacerbated 
by the compression and decompression algorithms used to store the large amounts of digital 
information (Porter 2008; Cohen et al 2007). CCTV systems are designed to display images 
on monitors. Obtaining still images for purposes of comparison is often problematic because 
of limitations with CCTV player software. Most software will capture still images from the 
footage, but frequently at a reduced resolution. This limits the ability to record or display the 
kinds of clearly resolved stills suited to comparative analysis. 
Overall, parameters affecting resolution include: 
•   the resolution of the optical system; 
•   the degree of compression and decompression of the digital image; 
•   conversion of the images between digital and analogue and copying analogue 
images; 
•   the ability of the software to capture still images; 
•   the physical size of the digital image and extent of pixelation (also affected by 
increasing magnification); 
•   the range of the subject (e.g. the extent to which the face or feature fills the 
frame); 
•   the dynamic range of the image; and 
•   camera recording conditions, such as exposure, noise, lighting, cleanliness and 
the quality of lens. 
Consequently, high resolution images are not always available. 
                                                                                                                             
36  Porter’s research into the effects on facial morphology caused by image perspective suggests that 
morphological variations respond non-lineally. Signification variation occurs at distances between 0 and 1 
metre, moderate variation between 1 and 3 metres and little variation occurs beyond 3 metres. 
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Finally, it is desirable to address a popular misconception. Namely, that increasing image 
magnification (i.e. making the photographs or imaging larger in physical size) provides an 
increase of detail. Although true in principle, in practice it depends upon inherent qualities 
of the image. Magnification will increase the detail until the image quality parameters are 
exhausted. At this point any further increase will result in empty magnification. Empty 
magnification produces no increase of detail and in many cases the detail will be reduced. 
The parameters affecting empty magnification include: resolution, film grain or image noise, 
degree of subject movement, film format and digital image size (i.e. number of image 
pixels). The idea that magnification will simply and continuously increase detail is a gross 
simplification. The low resolution and image quality encountered in many contemporary 
CCTV systems affords little scope for magnification. Computer enhancement may help to 
obtain detail. However, enhancement is contingent upon properties of the recorded image. 
Figure 7 provides an example of the limits of magnification. 
Figure 7: Example of empty magnification. Starting with a reasonably resolved image 
(A), the ear of the person of interest is magnified (through B – D). (Images by 
G Porter.)  
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Populations, Distributions and Statistical Issues 
Technical issues with images are compounded by the lack of information about the 
frequency and distribution of facial and body features and the relationships between features 
– particularly among population sub-groups. 
To be reliable and accurate, identification based on images that is not predicated upon 
highly individualised features such as scars, ‘blemishes’ and tattoos, ought to rest upon 
detailed knowledge of the frequency of occurrence of various facial features within the 
relevant population. Without such data reliable conclusions can not be drawn from the 
observation that two images appear to share one or more characteristics. The observation 
that two images both display a particular facial characteristic, say a particular nose shape, 
only becomes probative if the image accurately captures the actual shape of the nose and we 
know how frequently that type of nose occurs within the relevant population.  
Over the course of the last century anthropologists and others have measured relatively 
small groups of individuals, but we require far more detailed information to reliably 
estimate the frequency of the occurrence of one or more features. Mardia et al (1996:658) 
explain that: 
The science behind this method, termed “facial mapping” by the UK press, is still emerging and 
the establishment of a reliable database of population statistics is now viewed as essential if we 
are to be able to lay down standards for facial comparisons which will ensure that any positive 
identification made is regarded as safe.37  
Developing the requisite database would be a considerable undertaking. It would need to 
include accurate measurements of a large number of characteristics across many (perhaps 
thousands of) individuals, encompassing different ethnic groups and sub-groups, and also 
combinations derived from mixed or multiple ethnicities.38 It is not enough just to know 
how frequently a facial characteristic occurs within the relevant population; we would also 
require information about the statistical independence of features.39 If two or more features 
are correlated (i.e., if the occurrence of one feature predicts the occurrence of another 
feature) then the probability that two images share both these features is higher than if the 
features are statistically independent. In the extreme case where the correlation coefficient is 
1.0 and the occurrence of the first feature perfectly predicts the occurrence of the second 
feature, then the observation that the two images share both features is no more informative 
that the observation that they share just one of these features. This can be easily explained. 
Imagine that the individual depicted in a CCTV image has two distinctive facial 
characteristics. For example, he might be seen to have a particular shape of nose and a 
particular shape of ear (consider Purkait & Singh 2008). If we had an adequate database, we 
might know that each of these characteristics is fairly rare, occurring in only 1 in 100 
members of the relevant population.40 If these characteristics are statistically independent of 
                                                                                                                             
37  Consider also the US National Research Council (1996 and 2009).  
38  This has raised problems for population statistics associated with DNA profiling. Consider Bropho v Western 
Australia and Aronson 2007. 
39  Most of the facial mapping decisions in Australia involve trials of persons of non-European origin. 
40  Given the problems with image quality it may not always be possible to determine the relevant suspect 
population. Consider, for example, what does the head in Figure 6 actually look like? Could we confidently 
assign a population or sub-population group and if so on the basis of 4a, 4b or 4c? Here, it is important to 
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each other, then the probability that someone selected at random from the relevant 
population will also have both of these characteristics is 0.0001, or one in ten thousand (i.e. 
0.01 x 0.01 = 0.0001), and on the face of it, this appears to provide strong support for the 
contention that the image is of the accused. However, if these characteristics are not 
independent of one another, for example if people with long noses also tend to have long 
ears, then it is much more likely that a person selected at random will have both these 
characteristics and the probative value of this evidence is greatly reduced (People v Collins; 
Tribe 1971). The stronger the correlation between these two characteristics, the greater the 
likelihood a face will have both of these features. In their analysis of the faces of 358 young 
white males, Mardia et al (1996:673) observed correlations as high as 0.94 between certain 
pairs of facial measurements. Thus, to draw a meaningful conclusion from the observation 
that two images share a set of characteristics we need to know both the frequency of 
occurrence of each of these characteristics and the extent of the statistical correlation 
between each pair of features.  
NSW courts have prevented facial mappers from presenting their conclusions in the form 
of probabilities (e.g. ‘It is 95 per cent certain that these two images are of the same person’), 
requiring instead that expert witnesses describe the similarities they have observed between 
two images.41 Avoiding the use of probabilistic language does not, however, overcome the 
statistical problems described above. This change represents a switch from an explicit to an 
implicit probability. Indeed, changing the way conclusions are expressed may actually 
disguise faulty reasoning and the absence of underlying population information. 
The Absence of a Standardised Procedure 
Not only is there no validation and few credible attempts to overcome technical problems 
with images, but among facial mappers there is little evidence of standardisation. 
Kemp and Coulson (2008a) undertook an international survey of all individuals involved 
in providing expert identification evidence from the examination of images. A total of 26 
individuals from several countries responded to a series of questions about their background 
and training, the techniques they employ, and factors affecting the accuracy of their 
conclusions. The most striking finding was the diversity of the responses. A few respondents 
reported that they always obtained comparison images from the same location as the original 
surveillance image, thereby introducing the potential to address some of the problems 
created by angles and image perspective. Most, however, reported that they never did this. 
About one third of the respondents claimed to use published population data to compute the 
probability that the two images were of the same person. Other respondents indicated that 
there was no publicly available data capable of supporting such an approach. While some 
respondents reported that their technique was largely unaffected by differences in the angle 
of view, image quality or the elapsed time between two images, others reported that each of 
these factors would, to varying degrees, affect the accuracy of their results (though in ways 
that were not explained or quantified). 
                                                                                                  
emphasise that it is accepted in DNA cases that it is appropriate to use the database linked to the relevant 
suspect. See, for example, R v Pantoja; R v Doheny and Adams. 
41  This occurred in Alrekabi. Though not based on any studies, recourse to ‘95’ was clearly an appeal to statistical 
significance and the trappings of experimental science. 
MARCH 2009 LAW’S LOOKING GLASS    359 
Unconscious Influence 
These problems with expert identification are exacerbated by the inability of expert 
witnesses to overcome prejudicial biases. Several decades of experimental research 
demonstrate that an individual’s expectations and prior beliefs tend to influence their 
judgment. Significantly, these findings apply to experts. One recent study illustrates how 
trained forensic scientists were not able to overcome biasing information even where that 
information is unrelated to their actual analysis. 
Dror et al demonstrated that the conclusions reached by professional fingerprint 
examiners could be significantly influenced by extraneous information (Dror et al 2006; 
Dror & Rosenthal 2008). In their study, five highly experienced fingerprint examiners were 
each re-presented with a pair of prints which, five years earlier, they had declared to be a 
match. The experts were unaware that they were considering samples they had previously 
matched, and on re-presentation the prints were accompanied by extraneous contextual 
information about the case which suggested that they did not match. Of the five experts 
tested, only one resisted the influence of the extraneous information and did not change their 
original opinion. Of the four others, three reversed their original decision and concluded that 
the prints did not match, while the fourth declared that it was not possible to make a definite 
determination. This experiment indicates that even highly trained individuals using 
standardised techniques can be influenced by expectations induced through contextual 
information. 
In the case of facial mapping there are several significant biasing factors that probably 
influence the expert witness’ opinion. For example, if the operator examines the surveillance 
image and the reference image simultaneously, there is a danger that ambiguous 
characteristics of the surveillance image will be resolved – in their judgment – by 
characteristics of the reference image. There is also the danger of suggestion, where the 
operator knows that others – typically investigating police – already believe that the two 
images are a match. Currently, it is standard procedure for investigating officers, in their 
communications with facial mappers, to disclose this information, and include the 
incriminating images and reference photographs within the same package. In Australia, it is 
exceptional for the police to include more than one set of reference photographs. Even when 
not formally disclosed, the suspicions of investigating officers tend to be unambiguous. 
The UK barrister, Andrew Campbell-Tiech QC (2005), provides another example of the 
influence of exogenous factors. In this case four independent facial mapping analysts were 
asked to provide reports comparing surveillance images to reference images of a suspect in a 
murder investigation. Initially, all the analysts agreed there was some support for a match.42 
Some time later, however, investigating police decided they had arrested the wrong person 
and identified a new suspect. The same analysts were then asked to compare the original 
CCTV images with photographs of the new suspect. This time two of the experts returned 
an ‘inconclusive’ finding, the third concluded that there was ‘support’ for the proposition 
that the images were not of the same person, and the fourth that there was ‘powerful 
support’ that they were the same person.43 The police then asked the third expert to 
reconsider his analysis, making it clear that they felt his most recent conclusion might be 
mistaken. On reviewing his findings, and without access to additional photographic 
                                                                                                                             
42  In England expert witnesses are permitted to give positive identification evidence. That is, they are allowed to 
say that the person in the suspect image is the person on trial. See Attorney General’s Reference (No 2). 
43  This pervasive terminology comes from Bromby 2003. 
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evidence, the expert concluded that he could not exclude the possibility that the suspect was 
the person shown in the CCTV images.44 
The Influence of Expert Identification Evidence upon Jurors (and Others) 
In the previous sub-sections we explained that facial mapping techniques have not been 
formally evaluated, and identified a range of factors that tend to undermine the reliability of 
facial mapping evidence. This final sub-section compounds these other issues by suggesting 
that expert identification evidence is likely to exert considerable influence on the tribunal of 
fact. 
Experimental research has demonstrated that, although we are able to recognise very 
familiar faces from poor quality images, we struggle to identify unfamiliar faces even when 
image quality (or resolution) is high. Kemp et al (1997) investigated the ability of shop 
assistants to determine whether a photograph on a credit card was of the unfamiliar person 
attempting to use the credit card to purchase goods. Although this task did not require the 
participants to remember the faces, overall performance was less than 50 per cent accurate. 
Burton et al (1999) showed students images from a CCTV system which monitored the 
entrance of a university building. Despite very poor image quality students were able to 
recognise academics who had taught them, but were unable to match high quality images of 
unfamiliar academics. Overall, these and other studies suggest that people make many errors 
when trying to determine whether two different images are of the same unfamiliar person. 
This, of course, is the task facing jurors when presented with surveillance images and a 
defendant in the dock (as in Smith).  
In a recent experimental study of the influence of facial mapping evidence, Kemp et al 
(2008b) provided participants (undergraduate students) with high quality video sequences of 
a defendant in court. The participants were then shown CCTV sequences featuring either the 
defendant or a different individual fleeing a crime scene. Participants were required to 
decide whether the person in the CCTV material was the defendant. As part of the 
experiment they were also presented with expert opinion evidence led by either a 
hypothetical prosecution or defence. The results showed that the participants’ initial 
judgments were often inaccurate. About half of the participants who saw someone other 
than the defendant were prepared to convict the defendant. However, once a participant had 
read an expert report, their verdict was predicted only by the content of the report. That is, 
most of the participants were persuaded to adopt the position advocated by the facial 
mapping expert even when that assessment was wrong. 
In summary, it seems that jurors are likely to make identification errors based upon 
photographic and video evidence and to place considerable weight upon the opinions of 
expert witnesses even when they are wrong.  
Forensic Problems Caused by Expert Identification Evidence  
Having just explored some of the reasons why expert identification evidence based on 
images may be unreliable this section suggests that many of the traditional safeguards (e.g. 
admissibility standards, exclusionary discretions, cross-examination and judicial directions) 
                                                                                                                             
44  Here, it is useful to consider recent criticism of the language used by forensic pathologists and scientists in 
Canada. See Goudge 2008:44-45. 
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may not be particularly effective means for identifying, exploring or managing evidentiary 
problems. Traditional adversarial procedures do not ensure that fact finders will be 
consistently or meaningfully exposed to methodological frailties or appreciate the extent to 
which expert opinions are based on appeals to experience and subjective assessments.45 The 
upshot, we contend, is that many of the limitations with expert identifications are not 
adequately conveyed and, in consequence, the protections afforded to the accused have 
primarily symbolic value. 
Admissibility Standards and Discretionary Exclusions  
Our existing admissibility standards and exclusionary discretions have done little to identify 
or alleviate the many problems with expert identification evidence based on images.46 The 
common law, with its emphasis on the existence of a ‘field’ and whether a person is an 
‘expert’ (in that field), like the current approach to ‘specialised knowledge’ and the ‘basis’ 
of opinions under s79 of the UEL, have not encouraged judges to attend to the validity and 
reliability of expert opinion evidence. Instead, judges (and many lawyers) have focused 
attention on non-technical dimensions of expert identification evidence, such as formal 
qualifications and ‘experience’ – whether the witness has previously testified, and whether 
similar evidence has been received in other Anglophone jurisdictions. Unfortunately, formal 
qualifications, prior experience as an expert witness, and the practices in English courts tell 
us little about the validity or reliability of an expert’s opinions. 
Here it is useful to reiterate that there is no facial mapping ‘field’ or discipline, no 
specialised facial mapping knowledge, no university courses, no qualifications, no dedicated 
journals or textbooks, no attempts to standardise or regulate techniques, and no serious 
attempt to test or validate the range of methods used by its disparate practitioners.47 Almost 
all of the extant studies with relevance to identification from images are critical of facial 
mapping or suggest that identifications based on images require cautious empirically 
predicated responses. Most suggest that things are far more complicated than those 
proffering their opinion for the prosecution would seem – on the basis of their testimony and 
reports – to acknowledge (Costigan 2007; US National Research Council 2009).48 
To the extent that judges have allowed anatomists and physical anthropologists (and even 
police officers as ad hoc experts) to testify we can only wonder what the ‘basis’ in their 
‘training, study and experience’ actually is. How do these witnesses overcome the distortion 
caused by lenses and lighting? What in their training renders them proficient at making 
comparisons between two-dimensional images; especially where the images are of poor 
quality, taken from different angles, with different cameras, with different image 
perspectives, with months or years intervening? What relevance does facial reconstruction 
or anatomical terminology (or experience as a police officer) have to photographic 
                                                                                                                             
45  These have been described pejoratively as ipse dixit – ‘dogmatic statement resting merely on the speaker’s 
authority’ – in some of the leading US and Australian decisions. See, for example, General Electric Co v 
Joiner at 146 and Tang at [138]. 
46  Many of the issues canvassed here, for example, have not been raised or developed in trials and appeals. For a 
more expansive discussion of admissibility rules and discretions, see Edmond 2008b. 
47  Consider the very loose framework described in the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, National working practices in facial imaging (2003). It is not our intention to suggest 
that university courses, standardisation and protocols could somehow overcome the failure to rigorously 
validate facial mapping techniques, but rather that these omissions and inadequacies exemplify the extent of 
the problems. 
48  For an example of limitations working in very favourable experimental conditions, see Lynnerup et al 2003. 
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comparisons and identifications?49 Abilities, we contend, should be demonstrated rather 
than asserted, particularly where techniques and methods have obvious limitations, have 
been subjected to serious and unanswered criticism, and are susceptible to testing and 
validation. 
In the wake of Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) lawyers and judges were 
encouraged to take a renewed interest in the basis of opinions derived using ‘specialised 
knowledge’: 
[I]t must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for 
it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other 
intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the 
field of “specialised knowledge” in which the witness is expert by reason of “training, study or 
experience”, and on which the opinion is “wholly or substantially based”, applies to the facts 
assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded (Makita at [85]; HG at [39]-[41]; 
see also Sydney Wide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Pty Ltd at [7]). 
This, unfortunately, has tended to encourage only a perfunctory interest in the techniques 
and procedures relied upon by experts. In the case of expert identification evidence, most 
judges have been satisfied with a vague description of a procedure, even if the ‘procedure’ 
has not been shown to reliably produce the kinds of results claimed, and even if the 
‘procedure’ merely involves macroscopic comparison of two images on a computer screen. 
In addition, the exclusionary discretions, based on Christie at common law and ss 135 
and 137 under the UEL, have exerted almost no discernible impact on the reception of 
opinion evidence about images. Intended to balance the probative value of evidence against 
the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused, they are rarely used to exclude incriminating 
expert opinion evidence adduced by the prosecution. Given the many weaknesses with facial 
mapping evidence we might expect that evidence of unknown probative value would be 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused (at least some of the time). 
Judges, however, appear reluctant to make any assessment of the actual probative value of 
the prosecution’s expert opinion evidence for fear of trespassing on the prerogatives of the 
jury (Edmond 2008b). 
Defence, Prosecution and the Adversarial Criminal Trial 
Judges tend to admit incriminating expert opinion evidence because they believe that 
problems with validity and reliability, like the credibility of an expert, can be productively 
explored during cross-examination, or by calling a rebuttal expert. This tendency does not 
acknowledge the very different roles that prosecution and defence experts play in criminal 
proceedings (and pleas). It is, moreover, not consistent with the traditional burden of proof. 
Whereas incriminating expert identification evidence typically forms part of the coherent 
circumstantial case against the accused, rebuttal evidence not infrequently involves discrete 
and sometimes technical criticisms of the expert opinion evidence adduced by the 
prosecutor. In consequence, it is not uncommon for rebuttal experts to report on problems 
and uncertainty without undertaking their own assessment or investigation.50 
                                                                                                                             
49  Even if the anatomists had been involved in anthropometrics and comparative anthropology in a way that 
might satisfy ‘experience’, judges and prosecutors should not disregard the validity and reliability of expert 
identification evidence. 
50  Though, see the response in R v Madigan at [107]. 
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The admission of expert opinion evidence that is unreliable – or of unknown reliability – 
places the defence at a serious disadvantage. Whenever the prosecution adduces expert 
identification evidence it obliges the defence to respond, either by cross-examining the 
expert witness (which typically requires expert assistance) or calling a rebuttal expert (if 
such an expert is available and affordable). Rather than require the prosecution to 
demonstrate the validity and reliability of their incriminating opinion evidence as a 
condition regulating admissibility, it transfers to the defence the responsibility for 
demonstrating that the evidence is unreliable or insufficiently certain. This represents 
inappropriate cost and burden shifting. 
Furthermore, the conventional adversarial trial may be inadequate as a means of exposing 
the limitations with incriminating expert opinion evidence. 
Just because cross-examination might be able to expose problems with a technique or an expert 
might be found who is willing to testify about weaknesses in the forensic science evidence, does 
not mean that these should provide the primary bulwark against unreliable and prejudicial expert 
opinion evidence adduced by the prosecution. Facilitating cross-examination or allowing the 
defence to call rebuttal expertise does not make a trial fair. Structural symmetry is not the same 
as substantial fairness (Edmond 2008b:38).51 
Directions and Warnings 
Frequently, as with other problematic forms of evidence, facial mapping is admitted upon 
the understanding that where robust adversarialism leaves residual risks, those risks can be 
reduced by judicial instruction. Unfortunately, almost all of the empirical research suggests 
that judicial comments, directions and warnings are either ineffective or of limited 
effectiveness (see ALRC 2005:591-595; Lieberman & Sales 1999:18.1; Ogloff & Rose 
2005:407).  
Similarity/Difference Evidence 
It is important to acknowledge that senior judges have imposed some limitations on the 
provision of expert identification evidence derived from images. In NSW, for example, the 
CCA has endeavoured to prevent expert witnesses from making positive identifications (in 
court, at least). These limitations have been imposed in an attempt to reduce the potential for 
prejudice. Restricting facial mapping evidence to similarities, however, might not provide 
much in the way of meaningful protection to the accused. In most trials the jury is left with 
little doubt that it is the expert’s considered opinion that there are no meaningful differences 
between the accused and the unknown person in the incriminating images.  
Legal conventions, rather than scientific norms or empirical research, prevent experts 
from proffering their opinion and the strength of their conviction (Merton 1973:266-278; 
Mitroff 1974; Mulkay 1980). Ironically, these legal constraints, by imposing a veneer of 
caution and qualification, may make prosecution expert witnesses appear more rigorous and 
more credible than they actually are.  
Allowing experts to provide evidence of similarities simply elides methodological 
scrutiny of whether anatomists, physical anthropologists and others, are actually able to see 
similarities and differences better than lay people, and, more fundamentally, whether any 
                                                                                                                             
51  In Murdoch, Jung, Alrekabi (2007) and Pera (2007 and 2008) trial judges and Courts of Criminal Appeal seem 
to have been comforted by the participation of experts called by the defence. 
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similarities and differences in the images are real or artefactual. A formidable technical 
vocabulary and/or considerable experience dealing with bodies does not enable an anatomist 
to observe detail not captured in the recorded image, nor intuitively to overcome the 
distorting effects of lighting, shadows, angles, lenses or image perspective (e.g. Figures 3 
and 6). 
Developing Negatives 
There are good reasons to doubt the probative value of expert identification evidence based 
on images as it currently appears in Australian (and English and New Zealand) courts. There 
are also good reasons to question many of the safeguards routinely invoked to reassure those 
concerned about the reliability of expert evidence, the fairness of trials and the safety of 
criminal convictions. 
Images as Evidence  
Since the inception of photography, scholars and practitioners have warned about using 
images to prove things. Photographs, they lament, are too often presumed to be neutral, 
mechanical facts-on-paper, whose close and careful scrutiny yields truth (Goodwin 1994, 
1995). The proliferation and ubiquity of photographic and video images has given us a 
familiarity and confidence that creates a distorted sense of their reliability and accuracy. 
Long ago Walter Benjamin noted that technologies of image production and reproduction 
had the effect of ‘democratising’ visuality, but he simultaneously wondered, ‘isn’t a 
photographer who can’t read his own pictures worth less than an illiterate?’ (1935 
[1980]:215). Today, this question is no longer rhetorical. In an age of mass surveillance, 
where cameras record many of our activities and interactions, those viewing the recorded 
images may be inclined to believe that an objective truth is readily available.52 Theorists 
suggest that we have become enculturated: ‘reading’ photographs as though we derive 
knowledge from them spontaneously or intuitively (Benjamin 1935 [1980]; Barthes 1981:6, 
85; Sontag 1977:5, 153; 2002; Berger 1980:293; Bourdieu 1990:22; Eco 1982:32; Morris 
1988:151; Solomon-Godeau 1991:189; Sekula 1984:96-97; Flusser 2000:52; Young 
1996:16). John Tagg, an historian of photography, neatly captures this quandary: ‘To serve 
as evidence and record, the image had to be said to speak for itself, though only qualified 
experts could read its lips’ (1992:129; see also R v Luttrell and Hamberger). 
Despite admonitions and caveats, law has embraced photography’s evidentiary prowess 
without ever developing an adequate jurisprudence. Jennifer Mnookin, in her legal history 
of photography, describes how in 1889, a Massachusetts lawyer argued that ‘[t]he 
photograph is something more than a copy; it is a fac simile, and it is a perfect record of 
facts, not subject to prejudice, bias, or defective memory’ (1998:18). Nevertheless, early 
legal uses of photography (and x-rays) limited them to ‘illustrating’ other evidence, rather 
than serving as independent proof (Mnookin 1998:13, 43-44; Golan 2004b). This limitation 
rested upon an assumption that remains powerful today. Criminal courts have tended to 
prefer the evidence of eyewitnesses, particularly in the area of identification evidence. The 
UEL maintains this distinction; preferring identification evidence to come from 
                                                                                                                             
52  Compare Judith Butler’s (1992) critique of the ‘smart bomb’ deployed in the first Gulf War, a bomb with a 
camera attached to it, that could not visually capture its own destructiveness. Butler wrote that the ‘smart 
bomb’ eliminated ‘the phantasmatic distinction between the hit and its consequences’ (at 11). 
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identification parades. Identification based on photographs is deemed inferior and, in 
principle, only admissible when it is not ‘reasonable’ to conduct a live parade.53 The 
preference for eyewitness identification (whether live or from photographs) persists despite 
an expansive body of psychological scholarship documenting problems with eyewitness 
identification which, significantly for the criminal justice system, are accentuated by stress 
and pain, the presence of weapons and disguises, and racial differences.54 And, despite the 
fact that a high proportion of miscarriages of justice include mistaken eyewitness 
identification evidence (Scheck et al 2000).55 
The High Court’s decision in Smith created a market for expert identification evidence. It 
followed a trial where the eight eyewitnesses to a bank robbery gave conflicting descriptions 
of the particular offender, as: ‘Aboriginal’, ‘coffee-colour’, ‘South American’ and ‘white’.56 
Asking police officers to identify the robbers from security photographs was intended to 
overcome the problems with this inconsistent eyewitness evidence.57 The High Court 
decided that the evidence of the police officers added nothing to the jury’s own capacity, 
particularly as the police officers had no ‘expertise’ that might help the jury to ‘read’ the 
photographs. When Smith was re-tried, without the police officers narrating the images, he 
was acquitted.58 
As the number of images associated with crimes has increased, identification ‘experts’ 
have entered the marketplace, purportedly free from the stresses and distractions that 
diminish the reliability of eyewitness and victim identifications. Unfortunately, little 
attention has been given to the reliability of their evidence, particularly the effect of ‘race’ – 
remember Smith, BLM, Kaliyanda (Aboriginal defendants), Tang, Jung (Asian defendants), 
Pera (Fijian defendant) and Alrekabi (Iraqi defendant) – on the reliability of expert 
identification evidence as well as the impact of incriminating expert opinions in areas where 
lay people are known to experience difficulty. 
The Need for Demonstrable Reliability: Lewis (and Carroll) 
Despite the critical nature of this article, it is not our intention to reject all expert 
identification evidence based on images. While facial mapping evidence appears to be based 
upon untested techniques, loosely linked to experience and formal training, several 
techniques are currently being evaluated and refined and in some areas protocols have been 
proposed or could be. We will discuss the potential for expert identification based on images 
below. At this point, sensitive to the limitations with face and body mapping, we wish to 
emphasise the importance of making expert opinion evidence based on images more reliable 
and legal practice more responsive (Redmayne 2001; Roberts 2008). Our admissibility 
                                                                                                                             
53  UEL Pt 3.9. Influential cases like Alexander v The Queen have meant that judges now recognise some of the 
dangers with lay eyewitness identification evidence. Judges are expected to give a warning where identification 
evidence is in issue: s116.  
54  The legal and psychological history of cross-racial identifications is outlined in New Jersey v Cromedy, 
regarded in many US jurisdictions as persuasive authority. See also Johnson 1984, and the entire special theme 
issue of Psychology, Public Policy and Law (2001) titled ‘The Other-Race Effect and Contemporary Criminal 
Justice: Eyewitness Identification and Jury Decision Making’. 
55  Interestingly, Australian judges have been resistant to the use of psychologists to explain the limitations with 
eyewitness evidence, particularly in an attempt to de-bunk myths about lay identification evidence in stressful 
situations. See Smith v The Queen 1990; R v Smith 2000; R v Gassy (No 2). 
56  Mundarra Smith v The Queen, S233/2000 and S234/2000 District Court transcript, extracted in High Court of 
Australia Appeal Book, 99-100, 104-105, 97, 103. 
57  An early cinematic exploration of this theme is found in the Akira Kirosawa film Rashomon (1953). 
58  For a more comprehensive critique of cross-racial identification, see Biber 2007:21- 26, 45-71. 
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jurisprudence can assist this goal by insisting on reliability as a condition governing the 
admissibility of incriminating expert identification evidence.59 
There is support for reading ‘reliability’ into ‘specialised knowledge’. Even in Tang the 
judges placed a premium on ‘knowledge’. They recognised that it ‘connotes more than 
subjective belief or unsupported speculation’. Chief Justice Spigelman even accepted that 
the ‘term applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such 
facts on good grounds’ (Tang at [153]-[154]). This definition was taken from Daubert v 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (1993), a decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. In attempting to define Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (1975) – which 
influenced the drafting of s79 of the UEL – the Supreme Court insisted on the need for 
evidentiary reliability when parsing the phrase ‘scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge’. In so doing, the majority even presented a set of criteria that might be used to 
assist judges to gauge legal reliability. These criteria included whether the technique had 
been tested, published, peer reviewed, whether it was generally accepted as well as 
information about the rate of error.60 After Daubert, federal and most State courts in the 
United States require evidence of reliability as a basis for the admissibility of all expert 
evidence.61 
In 2000, the Federal Rules of Evidence were revised. Rule 702 now states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case. 
Concern with reliability, self evidently, has become a central component of US admissibility 
jurisprudence. 
More recently, the Canadian Supreme Court and several of the provincial courts of 
appeal have also placed increasing emphasis on the reliability of incriminating expert 
opinion evidence. Writing for the majority in R v Trochym (2007) Deschamp J explained 
that in relation to expert opinion evidence, ‘[r]eliability is an essential component of 
admissibility’. She continued, ‘evidence that is not sufficiently reliable is likely to 
undermine the fundamental fairness of the criminal process’ (at [27]; see also R v Mohan; R 
v DD; R v J-LJ; Re Truscott). 
Although reliability has never been a central concern of admissibility jurisprudence in 
Australia, it has featured prominently in a number of Australian appeals and inquiries, 
particularly those associated with notorious miscarriages of justice (Morling QC 1987 
[Chamberlain Royal Commission]; Shannon QC 1984 [Splatt Royal Commission]; other 
references include Osland v The Queen at [53]; HG v The Queen at [58]; Velevski v The 
Queen at [82]). One of the clearest expressions emerged from the appeal in Lewis v The 
                                                                                                                             
59  Here, at the risk of terminological confusion, we are reverting to the ordinary meaning of ‘reliability’ (i.e. 
trustworthiness) rather than the more technical meaning discussed earlier. 
60  While, it is not our intention to suggest that the Daubert criteria are an accurate model of science or expertise, 
some of the criteria, like testing, the determination of error rates, along with publication and peer review would 
undoubtedly improve the quality of incriminating forensic science evidence. See Edmond 2008c. 
61  The Daubert criteria were flexibly extended to all expert opinion evidence in Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael. 
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Queen (1987).62 In Lewis, some of the odontologists engaged by the Crown to help secure 
the Chamberlain convictions compared a bite mark on the body of a complainant with the 
teeth of the accused and made a positive identification. Relevantly, these identification 
techniques were untested and of unknown reliability (Beecher-Monas 2009; see also 
Tomaszewski & Girdwoyn 2006). 
Criticising this evidence in the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory, Justice 
Maurice insisted that it was incumbent upon the Crown ‘to carefully lay the ground for the 
reception of the opinions expressed by [the odontologists]. It could only do this by proving 
the scientific reliability of the exercise they carried out’ (Lewis v The Queen at 122). Instead, 
the Crown ‘chose to rely on the witness’ qualifications and experience in the field of 
forensic dentistry generally, and, in particular, upon the impressive curriculum vitae’ (at 
122). Significantly, ‘[n]o experimental research was pointed to nor other studies which 
demonstrated the reliability of the deduction made by these witnesses’ (at 122-123). For 
Maurice J it was ‘not an answer … to say the defence may draw it out in cross-examination; 
that is an abdication of the Crown’s primary function in a criminal prosecution’ (at 123-124; 
endorsed in R v Tran at 242).  
Authority, international trends, the parochial need for ‘specialised knowledge’, and the 
desire for fair trials should all encourage Australian judges to read ‘reliability’ into s79 of 
the UEL and the common law equivalents. It is our contention that, where incriminating 
expert identification evidence is involved, demonstrable reliability should be a prerequisite 
to admissibility.63 This would not only raise the quality of expert opinion evidence and 
reduce the number of false convictions, but simultaneously enhance the professionalism of 
our forensic science institutions and personnel. After all, formal qualifications, long 
experience and prior appearances in other courts are not credible substitutes for validation 
studies, error rates and proficiency testing. Nor should it be glibly assumed that procedural 
safeguards, exclusionary discretions and warnings afford adequate protection against 
incriminating expert identification evidence based on images. 
Codes of Conduct, Expert Guidelines and Professional Ethics 
The emphasis on reliability is important because court rules, codes of conduct and 
professional guidelines do not seem to offer a solution. They have not prevented – as we 
have endeavoured to explain – incriminating expert opinion evidence of unknown reliability 
from entering serious criminal proceedings. This is an important observation because it 
suggests that codes and ethical precepts may be little more than symbolic (or aspirational).64 
In all of the Australian cases where an expert witness gave identification evidence based on 
images, the testimony was proffered in the shadow of quite elaborate codes of practice.  
These codes make the expert witnesses’ duty to the court unambiguous. 
2 General duty to the court 
(1) An expert witness has an overriding duty to assist the court impartially on matters 
relevant to the expert witness’s area of expertise. 
                                                                                                                             
62  Lewis v The Queen was handed down in the same year as the Morling Report (1987). See also R v Carroll.  
63  Consider the response to admissibility challenges to DNA evidence in R v Karger and R v Gallagher. In 
Gallagher at [36], [62], [72], [114], [140], for example, Barr J ruled that DNA typing was admissible under 
s79 on the basis that the system was properly validated, reliable and accurate. 
64  For some discussion of impartiality and law reform, see Edmond 2005, 2009. 
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(2) An expert witness’s paramount duty is to the court and not to any party to the 
proceedings (including the person retaining the expert witness). 
(3) An expert witness is not an advocate for a party.65  
They also require an expert report (and implicitly testimony) to include: 
(b) the facts, and assumptions of fact, on which the opinions in the report are based … 
(c) the expert’s reasons for each opinion expressed, 
(d) if applicable, that a particular issue falls outside the expert’s field of expertise, 
(e) any literature or other materials utilised in support of the opinions, 
(f)  any examinations, tests or other investigations on which the expert has relied, 
including details of the qualifications of the person who carried them out … 
(2) If an expert witness who prepares an expert’s report believes that it may be incomplete 
or inaccurate without some qualification, the qualification must be stated in the report. 
(3)  If an expert witness considers that his or her opinion is not a concluded opinion because 
of insufficient research or insufficient data or for any other reason, this must be stated 
when the opinion is expressed.66 
Notwithstanding these codes, expert witnesses called by the prosecution have not adverted 
to the lack of research or the need for testing, the unknown reliability of their opinions, the 
range of methodological problems with their opinions or precisely how their education, 
training and experience enables them to make the kinds of identifications and comparisons 
presented in reports and court. On the contrary, the absence of validation studies is often 
disguised by reference to publications, study and experience of marginal relevance.67 
Sometimes experts contend that those working alongside them independently confirm – or 
peer review – their conclusions, even in the absence of validation studies or standardised 
procedures (consider Edmond 2008a). 
Similarly, professional codes and formal ethical frameworks promoted by scientific 
institutions and forensic science societies, as well as those applying to prosecutors (and 
defence counsel), have not operated as effective barriers against the production and use of 
incriminating expert opinions of unknown reliability.68 
                                                                                                                             
65  Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Sch 7, 2 and Practice Direction: Guidelines for Expert Witnesses 
in Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia (2008). The expectations upon State employees and 
consultants could hardly be lower than the expectations imposed upon experts participating in civil litigation 
and its preparatory stages. 
66  Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Sch 7, 5(1), (2) and (3). 
67  In Tang, at [72], the citations included law review articles and early papers but no studies that supported 
validity or reliability. Little, if any, of the critical work, which these witnesses must certainly have some 
awareness of, even if only from earlier court cases, seems to be included (or made explicit) in their reports. 
68  ANZFSS, Code of Ethics <www.anzfss.org.au/code_of_ethics.htm> accessed 12 August 2008; NSWDPP, 
Code of Conduct (2008); OHCHR, Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (1990). 
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Improving Expert Identification Evidence Based on Images 
Pragmatism Rather than Science: An Immediate (Intermediate) Step? 
Even in the absence of validation studies, dramatic improvement to the provision of expert 
identification evidence could be produced through the impositions of a simple prophylactic. 
Courts could, for example, require two different experts to each examine a single set of 
photographs – one would examine a reference set of images of the suspect, and the other a 
set of images of the unknown person associated with the crime – using a pre-determined set 
of anatomical parameters. Attention could even be focused on particular regions of the body 
or features, such as ears or nose or head shape, based on a preliminary examination of what 
the images of the unknown person appear to reveal. The descriptions prepared by each of 
the experts could then be compared. Differences between the descriptions would 
presumably lead to the exclusion of this evidence. Low level consistency might not be 
sufficiently probative to overcome the dangers (s137) or the expenditure of time and 
resources (s135).69 
It is important to emphasise that such an approach is not a validation study. It would not 
overcome problems with similarity nor guarantee reliability. Rather, it represents a kind of 
pragmatism that reflects the need for more reliable expert identification evidence and 
provides an overly credulous judiciary with the means to prevent some of the most 
egregious expert identification evidence from gaining entry to criminal trials. 
Independent Validation and Reliability Studies  
Notwithstanding the previous paragraphs, to gain admissibility there should be evidence 
supporting the validity and reliability of incriminating expert opinion evidence.70 That is, 
there should be independent studies with positive results, published in peer-reviewed 
journals of international standing (or, at a minimum, made publicly available). Further, there 
should be judicial scrutiny of whether the techniques and theories used by the particular 
expert are sufficiently similar to those that have been validated as well as evidence of the 
particular expert’s credentials and personal proficiency. 
What would validation studies and proficiency testing look like? Any credible testing 
regime would require the candidates to make identifications or describe similarities and 
differences under controlled conditions. That is, where those testing the facial mapping 
‘experts’ would have access to the identity of those in the images and the test subjects would 
not. The facial mappers would be given several sets of reference images and would be asked 
whether a person of interest in CCTV images resembled any of the persons in the reference 
photos, and why. They would be told that the persons of interest from the reference photos 
may not be included among the sample. Such tests could be readily operationalised. 
More Cautious Uses of Apparently Incriminating Images 
Earlier, in Tang, we encountered Dr Sutisno referring to ‘unique identifiers’. While the 
features described by Dr Sutisno (e.g. ‘wide and thick … lips’ and ‘square chin’) do not 
                                                                                                                             
69  This would, of course, need to be a formal process. The two experts would need to be spatially removed and 
genuinely independent. 
70  The prosecution must satisfy the trial judge, using evidence, that on the balance of probabilities, the techniques 
are reliable. See Beecher-Monas 2006. 
370    CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE VOLUME 20 NUMBER 3 
strike us as ‘unique’, it is important to acknowledge that there will be times when facial and 
body features appearing in images are not particularly controversial and could facilitate 
confident and possibly even positive identifications (or reliably contribute to a 
circumstantial case). A distinctive tattoo, for example, especially if combined with other 
discriminating features (e.g. skin blemishes or scars) and captured in clearly resolved 
images, would generally provide highly probative evidence. Similarly, there will be 
occasions where even a casual inspection of images – including poorly resolved images – 
would allow a lay observer to distinguish an offender from a person of interest. Where the 
person of interest is missing an arm and the suspect has all four limbs affords a very simple 
example. Most cases will be far less clear. In many cases it will be preferable to allow 
images to go before the jury without the incriminating, though untested, opinions of 
‘experts’ or to simply exclude poorly resolved images because they have low probative 
value and the dangers to the accused are considerable.71 Unless identification experts 
validate their practices they should not be allowed to interpret images in court regardless of 
whether the images are highly resolved, taken with the same cameras, at the same angles 
and with similar image perspectives. And, if images have limited potential for identification 
purposes then it may be unfairly prejudicial to the accused to show them to the jury, 
especially where they depict violence. 
The main difficulty with the use of images is determining if and when they should be 
presented to the jury. That is, deciding whether the images are sufficiently clear, 
unambiguous or reliable to enable recourse to individuating (i.e. particularly distinctive) 
features, and in what circumstances the images are sufficiently clear to enable the exclusion 
of particular suspects (see Hauser 2004; US v Johnson; Bruegge 1999; consider also 
Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition; US v Fabrizio; US v Salcido; US v Rodriguez-Pacheco). 
For, images can provide probative evidence but they can also mislead. Often they mislead in 
ways that are insidious, because they unwittingly deceive viewers: whether experts, lawyers, 
jurors or judges. We need to be careful about the circumstances in which we allow experts 
to narrate the contents of images, particularly where the narration makes them incriminating. 
In the absence of validation studies we should, perhaps, be more inclined to use images to 
exclude suspects rather than inculpate them. However, we also need to recognise that the 
unreliability of any interpretation can cut both ways. It would be wrong to think, in the 
absence of further research, that we could rely upon images for exoneration where 
considerable scope for interpretation remains. Differences, like apparent similarities, may be 
artefactual. 
Obviously these issues raise jurisprudential complexities and require more informed 
exercise of judicial discretions. They reinforce the need for further empirical research and 
the elaboration of a range of standards pertaining to: clarity of the image; the range, size and 
duration of the feature(s) depicted; data storage; the use of enhancement capabilities; ways 
to handle angle and image perspective; and, the impact of background factors.72 Judges 
should mediate jury access to images in ways that are sensitive to actual limitations and 
dangers as well as the difficulty of repairing misleading impressions in the context of the 
accusatorial criminal trial. Admission simpliciter, like the opinions of experts and judicial 
                                                                                                                             
71  Admission always needs to be considered against the criticisms developed earlier as well as the need to 
determine the probative value and weigh it against any unfair prejudice: UEL ss 135, 137. 
72  Porter is currently working on resolution standards that might help judges to make admissibility 
determinations. 
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directions, will not always provide the most appropriate way of dealing with (apparently) 
incriminating images. 
Law’s Looking Glass 
The treatment of expert identification evidence holds a mirror to our criminal justice system 
and its rationalistic pretensions. For the reasons we have outlined, unreliable incriminating 
expert opinion evidence and incriminating opinion evidence of unknown reliability should 
not be allowed to contaminate criminal trials. Although this article examined the 
epistemologically flimsy case of facial mapping, the fact that this opinion evidence has been 
admitted, relied upon and withstood appeals should induce disquiet. This disquiet will not 
be diminished by the knowledge that many of the problems with facial mapping are 
applicable to other types of forensic science evidence (e.g. voice identification, footprints, 
earprints, bite marks, tool marks, ballistics, blood spatter, hair comparison and fingerprints) 
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